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TRIAL TACTICS

Picking the Correct
Argument
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

P

robably no rule of thumb is more important
to a trial lawyer than this: You need only one
good theory of admissibility or objection to
win a point, and in many instances the key is to pick
the winner and avoid the losers. The rule is easy to
however, to apply than to acknowledge. A related
rule is that a lawyer who has a powerful, potentially
winning argument, may ultimately lose if that argu-

An Illustrative Case:
The Government’s Evidence
yers sometimes have in clearly identifying and emphasizing the winning argument is United States v.
Skelton, 514 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2008). John C. Skelton was indicted on one count of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(b), which provides as follows: “Whoever,
tion or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any
person or any threat to injure the person of another,
than twenty years, or both.” The government’s evidence follows.
In February 2006, Skelton called the alleged
victim, Terry Jacobs, on two occasions and told Jacobs that “Slim Gabriel wants his money.” (Id. at
436.) Skelton accused Jacobs of stealing his partner’s money and failing to pay his life insurance
and claimed Gabriel was going to get a percentage
of what Jacobs had stolen. Jacobs denied stealing
anything and claimed not to know Slim Gabriel.
Skelton responded that he had seen the books and
Jacobs had indeed stolen money. He told Jacobs that
Gabriel used to be a sheriff but was now head of the
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would be murdered if Gabriel did not get the money.
Skelton claimed to have connections with two sheriff departments whose deputies would take Jacobs
and shoot him in the head. Skelton demanded two
checks, in the amounts of $250,000 and $50,000,
and suggested that if Jacobs did not produce the
money Skelton would obtain it from Jacobs’s wife.
There was an eyewitness to the second Skelton call.
Victor Lujan, one of Jacobs’s coworkers, was sitting
next to Jacobs when he received the call. Lujan testichanged, and he became very nervous during the call.
He said that Jacobs then handed the phone to Lujan
who heard the caller state that if Jacobs “didn’t pay the
money, a city cop was actually going to pull him over
[and] was going to handcuff him and shoot him.” (Id.)
Within days of receiving the threat, Jacobs spoke
with Special Agent Morales who referred the case
to Texas Ranger Malone. Morales and Malone ascertained Skelton’s identity through phone records.
once worked for a company called Jolt Corporation
and became vice-president before the company dissolved in 1999. Jolt had failed to make payments
on a life insurance policy on one of its co-owners
who died in 1999. Jacobs suggested that the events
referred to by Skelton may have related to Jolt.
Skelton called Jacobs a couple of weeks after the
second threatening call and stated that he was aware
that Jacobs maintained a double set of books, that
Jacobs had stolen the insurance premiums when the
Jolt co-owner was dying of cancer, and that Skelton
would “call the income tax people showing you [Jacobs] stole the federal FICA.” (Id. at 437.) The only
threatening language during this call was Skelton’s
statement “[a]nd you’re either gonna give that money back or I’m going to deal with your ass, boy.”
Jacobs had obtained a recording device at the suggestion of the agents, and the device indicated that,
when he hung up the phone, he was nervous. At the
suggestion of law enforcement, Jacobs called Skelton several times in the next several weeks in an effort to get Skelton to make further threats. But Skelton made none and on one occasion told Jacobs that
he never wanted money for himself; he only wanted
Skelton to repay the previous owners of Jolt.

The Defense: Jacobs Was Lying
Skelton’s defense was that Jacobs was lying about
the telephone conversations. The defense was aware
that the government’s case turned heavily on Ja-
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alleged threatening call to Jacobs. Although Victor
Lujan was next to Jacobs during the second call,
Lujan heard only the end of the conversation. During the third conversation, Skelton appeared to try
to persuade Jacobs to repay money Skelton claimed
was stolen by Jacobs. And, thereafter, Jacobs repeatedly failed to induce additional threat evidence from
Skelton. Instead, Skelton claimed that he was only
trying to induce Jacobs to repay those from whom
he stole.
The defense, through cross-examination of Jacobs, was able to show that Jolt’s former co-owner’s
life insurance had lapsed because Jolt had not paid
the premiums, and that one of the companies owned
owner stole money from the company.
Defense counsel asked Jacobs during cross-examination whether he was testifying to win favor
from the government in the event that the IRS investigated Jolt’s books. Defense counsel also crossexamined Jacobs with respect to the third phone call
from Skelton to Jacobs. Defense counsel asked Jacobs, “Isn’t it a fact that you hung up within a second of [Skelton] mentioning the federal FICA so that
the agents that were going to hear this tape wouldn’t
learn about that?” Jacobs said “no” and denied that
he sounded more nervous at the time because of the
reference to FICA. (Id.)
The trial judge denied defense counsel’s request
to present extrinsic evidence that Jacobs was lying
about stealing money from Jolt.

Character Witnesses
After the government rested and Skelton’s motion
for judgment of acquittal was denied, Skelton called
eight character witnesses. All either had worked for
or were associated with Jolt. All offered both opintheir opinion Jacobs was not a truthful person and he
had the reputation of being untruthful.
opinion he was an honest man. Skelton was barred
by the trial judge from asking these witnesses “did
you know” or “have you heard” questions about spe-

The Jury’s Inquiry
The importance of the particulars of Jacobs’s testimony was underscored when the jury sent a note to
the trial judge after two hours of deliberation. The
note asked: “According to 18 U.S.C. Section 875(b),

does ‘threat to injure a person’ mean we have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a
threat to shoot or physical injury in general?” The
trial judge referred the jury back to the instructions
previously given, and the jury returned a verdict of
guilty. (Id. at 438.)

Specific Act Evidence: Intrinsic?
On appeal, Skelton complained that the trial judge
had abused discretion and denied him his right to
confront Jacobs by restricting his scope of cross-examination and barring evidence regarding Jacobs’s
stealing from Jolt and lying to the IRS. Appellate
defense counsel made one losing argument before
hitting on one that was a partial winner (although
a partial win on appeal usually, and here, is an ultimate loss).
evidence that Jacobs stole funds from Jolt and lied
to the IRS was “intrinsic” other act evidence admissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The court of
appeals rejected this argument after explaining the
intrinsic evidence concept as follows:
“Other act” evidence is “intrinsic” when the
evidence of the other act and evidence of the
crime charged are “inextricably intertwined”
or both acts are part of a “single criminal episode” or the other acts were “necessary preliminaries” to the crime charged. United States
v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1996)
(quoting United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d
823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990).) This evidence is
admissible to complete the story of the crime
by proving the immediate context of events
in time and place. Id. (citing United States v.
Kloock, 652 F.2d 492, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Royal, 972 F.2d 643, 647 (5th
Cir. 1992)). Intrinsic “other act” evidence does
not implicate Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and “consideration of its admissibility pursuant to Rule 404(b) is unnecessary.”
United States v. Garcia, 27 F.3d 1009, 1014
(5th Cir. 1994).
(514 F.3d at 440.)
The court concluded that “whether Jacobs stole
money from Jolt and lied to the IRS is irrelevant to
the question of whether Skelton threatened Jacobs,
especially given that the Government need not establish a motive for the alleged threat.” (Id.) Thus,
defense counsel lost round 1.
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Rounds 2 and 3: The Government Loses
The government argued that the extrinsic evidence
that Skelton wished to offer was inadmissible
under Rule 404(b) and Rule 608(b). It lost both
arguments.
The court of appeals found that Skelton was
not offering evidence regarding Jacobs’s theft of
funds and lying to the IRS to show that Jacobs
had a propensity to lie generally. Evidence offered
for this purpose would be inadmissible propensity
evidence. But the court recognized that Skelton
was offering the evidence to show that Jacobs had
a motive to lie about the alleged threat made by
Skelton, because by lying he could divert attention
from his own misdeeds and curry favor with the
government.
Similarly, the court rejected the government’s argument that Rule 608(b) barred Skelton’s evidence.
The court quoted from its opinion in United States
v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 802-03 (5th Cir. 1979),
(quoting United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513, 517
(9th Cir. 1977), opinion withdrawn and aff’d on
other grounds, 573 F.2d 599 (1978)), in explaining that the extrinsic evidence bar of Rule 608(b) is
limited to circumstances where the evidence is introduced to show a witness’s general character for
truthfulness:
Individual rules of evidence, in this instance
Rule 608(b), should not be read in isolation,
when to do so destroys the purpose of ascertaining the truth. This is especially so when a
witness directly contradicts the relevant evidence which Rule 608(b) seeks to exclude. . . .
Similarly, we believe that Rule 608(b) should
not stand as a bar to the admission of evidence
introduced to contradict, and which the jury
to a material issue of the case.
(514 F.3d at 442.)
Thus, the court rejected the government’s reliance
on Rules 404(b) and 608(b). The government lost
rounds 2 and 3.

The Right Argument: Bias
The court observed that evidence that is generally
admissible under Rule 608(b) may be admitted to
prove bias, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). The court
agreed with appellate defense counsel that Skelton’s
evidence was admissible bias evidence:

allegations that Jacobs stole funds from Jolt and
lied to the IRS tends to show that he has a motive
to lie in this case and should have been considered and evaluated as evidence of bias. The Supreme Court has recognized that “the exposure
of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper
and important function of the constitutionally
protected right to cross examination.” Davis [v.
Alaska], 415 U.S. [308] at 316-17 [(1974)]. The
Supreme Court has also recognized that “proof of
bias is almost always relevant because the jury,
historically been entitled to assess all evidence
which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a
witness’ testimony.” Abel, 469 U.S. at 52.
(514 F.3d at 442.)
This is the argument that trial defense counsel
should have pressed with the trial judge. It is a winning argument, at least in part. It was not a complete winner, however, because the court of appeals
concluded that Skelton was permitted to confront
Jacobs adequately and that the trial judge did not
abuse discretion in excluding additional evidence
pursuant to Rule 403:
At trial, although Skelton was not permitted
to introduce extrinsic evidence that Jacobs
actually stole money from Jolt and lied to the
IRS, he was permitted to explore Jacobs’ dealto ask if he was only testifying because of the
allegations concerning the IRS. He was also
permitted to ask Jacobs if he was lying in order to protect himself and whether he had received any assurances from the Government
that he would not be prosecuted for his alleged
misdeeds. Thus, we conclude that the district
court did not err in limiting Skelton’s cross-examination because it still gave Skelton ample
room to explore the issue of bias. Nor do we
frontation Clause violation given that Skelton
was nonetheless “permitted to expose to the
jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole
triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability
of the witness.” [United States v.] Restivo, 8
F.3d [274] at 278 [(5th Cir. 1993)] (quoting
Davis
a Confrontation Clause violation, any such er-
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ror was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, although Jacobs was a key witness, his
testimony that Skelton threatened to shoot him
was corroborated by Lujan and Skelton was
given ample room to explore the issue of bias
and otherwise attack the credibility of Jacobs.
(514 F.3d at 442.)

and a third party and found that there was no reason
for the trial judge to have barred the cross-examination of the government’s character witnesses. The
court concluded, however, that the ban on cross-examination of these witnesses did not implicate the
Confrontation Clause and did not deprive Skelton of
his opportunity to put on a meaningful defense.

The court’s analysis ultimately leads to Skelton’s
loss on appeal, and is subject to question. Arguably,
there is a big difference between asking questions of
a key witness like Jacobs that suggest he might have
a motive to lie, and actually demonstrating to the jury
that there is a motive to lie. Jacobs denied the motive, and there was no evidence admitted to contradict
him. Whether or not the court of appeals would have
made the same ruling had the bias argument been the
centerpiece of Skelton’s attack in the trial court and if
bias had been the principal argument made on appeal
is impossible to know. It does seem, however, that a
potentially winning argument loses force when it is
combined with weaker arguments.
The defense won round 4, bias, but lost the critical round 5, Rule 403.

The Importance of Choosing
the Right Theory

Cross-Examination of
Character Witnesses
It is important to recall that the trial judge not only
excluded extrinsic evidence that Jacobs stole money
from Jolt and lied to the IRS, but also barred Skelton from cross-examining the government’s character witnesses as to whether they knew or had heard
about Jacobs’s alleged misdeeds. The trial judge
mistakenly believed that the right to cross-examine
character witnesses (long recognized in cases such
as Michelson v. United States, 355 U.S. 469 (1948))
did not extend to character witnesses testifying about
a third party as opposed to a defendant. The court of
appeals rejected the distinction between a defendant

The end result of the trial judge’s rulings is that Skelton lost all opportunity to demonstrate that there was
a factual basis for his attack on Jacobs’s bias, and
also lost the opportunity to demonstrate that the defense character witnesses were more credible than the
government’s by cross-examining the government’s
character witnesses to show that they were aware of
the allegations leveled against Jacobs. The court of
appeals concludes that the trial judge permitted an
adequate opportunity for Skelton to test Jacobs’s bias
and that the error in barring cross-examination of the
character witnesses was harmless. Both of the court’s
conclusions are debatable. What is less debatable is
the point that a winning argument is less likely to
produce victory when it is sandwiched between and
among losing arguments. The bias argument appears
ciently clear in the trial court where it should have
been at the heart of the defense claims. Had it been
more powerfully argued at trial, the court of appeals
judge gave Skelton adequate opportunity to confront
the key witness against him. Had the bias argument
been more powerfully made at trial, the court of apthe restriction on the cross-examination of character
witnesses, considered together with the limitation on
bias evidence, deprived Skelton of a fair trial—i.e., a
fair chance for a full attack on Jacobs. ■
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